Not All Roads Lead to Rome: The Dangers of Applying Postmodern Pedagogies to Religious Studies

The playwright George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950) once remarked, “There is only one religion, though there are hundreds of versions of it.” We, however, live in an age that is far more pluralistic than Shaw’s ever was, a world where relativity reigns supreme. Pluralism, the belief that truth is not singular or unitary (Hinman 382); relativism, the belief that values are relative to a particular culture or group and cannot be judged outside that culture or group (Hinman 35); and subjectivism, an extreme form of relativism which affirms that each individual's beliefs are relative to that individual alone and cannot be judged from the outside by anyone else (Hinman 383), have been around for a long time, and come in assorted flavors such as the polytheisms of Hinduism and ancient Rome, pantheism, the sophists, and the views of Friedrich Nietzsche and Søren Kierkegaard, to name a few. These views are very popular in American academic institutions, where professors adopt relativistic views in order to teach different cultures and religions.

Unfortunately, when relativistic pedagogies are applied to religious studies, a subject that is clouded by meaningless terms and bipolar assumptions about religion, serious problems ensue. The assumption that all religions are the same or equal because they all supposedly teach similar principles is illogical and dangerous. The differences between “religions” are so many and so crucial that it is impossible to define what “religion” even is. This flawed approach also disregards and distorts history, including the merits and demerits of religions; discourages students from thinking critically about religion; and ignores the fact that all religions operate under different moralities and have certain agendas that they want fulfilled. And the means by which religions fulfill their agendas has serious philosophical, political, social, and economic implications as well. 

Most of my religious studies professors at UTEP asserted that all religions are equal (though they antagonized western religious traditions, Christianity in particular). But this is by no means a local or even a regional issue. In Living Religions, a textbook assigned for my major world religions class, Mary Pat Fisher explains that “some liberal scholars are . . . proposing that there is an underlying experiential unity among religions. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, for instance, concluded that the revelations of all religions have come from the same divine source. Christian theologian John Hick suggests that religions are culturally different responses to one and the same reality. The Muslim scholar Frithjof Schuon feels that there is a common mystical base underlying all religions” (482). Conservative scholars, furthermore, have recognized the relativistic trends in American institutions of higher education. "There are university professors today who are so enamored of academic freedom and so devoted to an endless search for truth," writes Dr. Gordon H. Clark, former Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at Butler University for 28 years, "that they are antagonistic to those who say they have found some. Possessing truth, in their view, is a violation of academic freedom" (99). Dr. Michael P. Lynch, associate professor of philosophy at the University of Connecticut, argues:

Under the banner of postmodernism, cynicism about truth and related notions like objectivity and knowledge has become the semiofficial philosophical stance of many academic disciplines. Roughly speaking, the attitude is that objective truth is an illusion and what we call truth is just another name for power. Consequently, if truth is valuable at all, it is valuable--as power is--merely as means. (2004)

Why have academic institutions adapted views that undermine their very purpose? According to columnist and political commentator John Leo, “One factor is that colleges now stress the need for each identity group to express its ‘voice’ or ‘narrative,’ without much scruple about whether the narratives are literally true. (Postmodern theory says there is no such thing as truth anyway.)” (2000). What do we need universities for, then, if knowledge is merely a matter of personal interpretation? And if truth is just another name for power, and the goal of universities is to preserve and promote truth, doesn’t that mean that we should oppose them for being oppressive?

To compound the problem further, it is impossible to adequately define the term religion because “religions” are simply too different. The etymology of religion is itself uncertain, stemming anywhere from "bond between humans and gods," "monastic life," "careful," or "go through again, read again" (“Religion”). Every religious studies textbook I have read acknowledges that religion is practically impossible to define. Dr. Clark argues that “the more definite the definition [of religion] is, the more clearly the writers are not writing on the same subject. . . . If the term God is so broadened as to include the usage of both Spinoza and the animists, the term and the definition of religion in which it is used become meaningless” (110, 119). In a textbook assigned for my philosophy of religion class, Exploring the Philosophy of Religion, David Stewart notes that defining religion “is difficult due to the diversity of meanings [the term] has acquired” and “the wide diversity of religious traditions” (1). Stewart himself offers no definition. "Religion is therefore such a complex and elusive topic," notes Fisher, "that some contemporary scholars of religion are seriously questioning whether 'religion' or 'religions' can be studied at all. They have determined that no matter where they try to grab the thing, other parts will get away" (1). How then can there be "religions," yet no "religion"?

In Anatomy of the Sacred: An Introduction to Religion, which was assigned for my introduction to religious studies course, James Livingston remarks that, even though religion is a universal human phenomenon, “Why, after all, should we think that the many religions of the world have some ‘essence’ in common? There are legions of particular religions, but perhaps no such thing as ‘religion’” (7). He proposes to define religion as “that system of activities and beliefs directed toward that which is perceived to be of sacred value and transforming power” (10). While this is a noble attempt, there are many problems with this definition, for the term sacred is left intentionally vague in order to include almost any inspiring belief or practice. The term transforming power is also vague, for if I believe that watching television is a “sacred” rite that makes me a better person, I have established my own religion. Many more irreligious practices and beliefs can be applied to this definition—the very thing Livingston was trying to avoid—but religious traditions that either believe everything is sacred or don’t care to make a distinction between the sacred and the profane, such as pantheism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, don’t fit the definition very well either. Livingston, moreover, ironically argues in direct contrast to the professor who assigned his textbook:

To be self-conscious and reflective about our beliefs does not mean, of course, that we become so open that our minds begin to resemble the proverbial sieve that cannot retain anything and through which all beliefs pass as though equally true and valuable. That is spiritual promiscuity. Our temptation today appears to be to fall into either an uncritical and slothful relativism or an uncritical and slothful dogmatism. (15)

The problem is twofold. One one hand, there are those who think that all religions are essentially the same; on the other there are those who dogmatically claim that their religion is the only true one—though they might not know what their own religion teaches—while all others are arbitrarily declared false. Both views, as Livingston comments, are uncritical and lazy.

Attempting to classify religions logically "fails because the divergences have occurred through no logical principles" (Clark 123). Some argue that the differences between religions are not substantial. But overlooking religious differences has dangerous consequences. “The failure of the U.S. government to grasp fully the religious dimensions of the conflicts in Southeast Asia and Iran explains, in part, our serious miscalculations and errors of judgment in those regions in recent history” (Livingston 13). The Bible, for example, teaches that Jesus Christ alone is God and the only way to eternal salvation (Jn. 14.6), thus regarding all other beliefs that are contrary to what He teaches as false (cf. Lk. 11.23, Jn. 8.24, Acts 4.12); that men should lead but are equal to women (1 Cor. 11, Gal. 3.28); that believers are to love their neighbors as well as their enemies (Lev. 19.18; Matt. 5, 19.19; Rom. 13); and that the Kingdom of God “is not of this world. If My [Christ’s] kingdom were of this world, then My servants would be fighting so that I would not be handed over to the Jews; but as it is, My kingdom is not of this realm" (Jn. 18.36). The Koran, on the other hand, deliberately rejects Christianity and teaches that it is blasphemy to worship Jesus as God (Surah 5:16-17), codifies rape and spousal abuse (Surah 2:223, 4:34), and orders Muslims to distrust and kill unbelievers, including Christians (Surah 5:50, 9:5), and to conquer the whole world under Islam (Surah 61:9, 48:28, 9:33), all of which directly contradict the teachings of the Bible. After looking at only two religions, it is evident that they are fundamentally different; they are, in fact, diametrically opposed, even though they both come from Judaism! The only way to argue that all religions are the same is to ignore what they actually teach.

Others argue that it is better to assume all religions are equal in academic settings in order to analyze them "impartially" and avoid offending people. So, rather than letting the students develop their critical thinking skills and evaluate each religion for themselves, the judgment is already made for them. They are discouraged from asking questions like, In what sense are all religions equal? In a moral sense? How is this possible, when every religion has its own moral code that contradicts another’s? Satanism, for example, teaches that pride, selfishness, and indulging in sexual immorality are all good things, while Christianity teaches the opposite. Professors should not have to lie about what religions teach for the sake of not offending students. Being honest about history can help us avoid repeating the mistakes of history.  

It is important to recognize that religions are vastly different from each other—irreconcilably different—and their teachings often contradict one another. A subject as serious as religion cannot simply be blanketed with false or inadequate assumptions that obscure the differences between them. I urge professors to evaluate their assumptions about religion and to consider an honest, straightforward, and perhaps more philosophical approach to teaching religious studies. They may not agree with any of the religions they discuss, but that doesn't mean they should change or disregard what the religions themselves teach and have taught historically in order to make them all equal and only superficially different. Professors should ensure that their own assumptions about religion do not distort the religions they teach; instead, they should explain the assumptions that each religion holds to, for every religion has its own ideology. A philosophical approach to studying religion would be far more fruitful, for philosophy, as William James characterizes it, is "the unusually stubborn attempt to think clearly." Thinking clearly about religion is very important in our interconnected world. To study religion philosophically, Stewart explains, “is to analyze critically the fundamental issues raised by religion and to subject these issues to rigorous scrutiny" (2). Using a philosophical approach, teachers can start by identifying a religion’s assumptions and then explain how that religion implicitly or explicitly derives its beliefs and practices from those assumptions in order to create an ideology or worldview, because every religion, regardless of whether it emphasizes doctrine, emotions, or mystical encounters, offers a way of viewing and experiencing the present world and possibly the world to come. In any case, I also urge students to question the assertions that professors make regarding matters of religion and to investigate religions for themselves, especially by seeking out primary sources. These issues are far too important to overlook.

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Works Cited

• Clark, Gordon H. Three Types of Religious Philosophy. Rpt. in Christian Philosophy: The Works of Gordon Haddon Clark. Ed. John W. Robbins. Vol. 4. Unicoi: Trinity Foundation, 2004. 15-103. Print.
• ----. Religion, Reason, and Revelation. Rpt. in Christian Philosophy: The Works of Gordon Haddon Clark. Ed. John W. Robbins. Vol. 4. Unicoi: Trinity Foundation, 2004. 107-270. Print. 
• Fisher, Mary Pat. Living Religions. 6th ed. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2005. Print.
• Hinman, Lawrence M. Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory. 3rd ed. Belmont: Wadsworth, 2003. Print.

• Leo, John. "Race and gender games on campus." The Washington Times 1 June 2000, final ed. (Commentary): A14. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 4 Apr. 2012.

• Livingston, James C. Anatomy of the Sacred: An Introduction to Religion. 5^th ed. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2005. Print.

• Lynch, Michael P. "Who Cares About The Truth?" Chronicle Of Higher Education 51.3 (2004): B6-B8. Academic Search Complete. Web. 7 Apr. 2012.

• “Religion.” Online Etymology Dictionary. Douglas Harper, 2012. Web. 4 Apr. 2012.

• Stewart, David. Exploring the Philosophy of Religion. 7^th ed. Upper Saddle River: Pearson, 2010. Print.